political. As they shifted from temporary migrants to permanent residents they become central to Figueres" social democratic experiment. Blacks function as an other that make Costa Ricans more white.
Nicas have also played a central role in the Costa Rican national image, but in an opposite way.
2 Certainly some of the opposition to them stems from the same basis as the opposition to Afro-Costarricans earlier in the twentieth century. There is concern that they are taking jobs that rightly belong to nationals. But more than this, the issue with nicas appears to be twofold. First, they function as scapegoats to a larger issue, which is the decline of the Costa Rican welfare state. Frustration with the state"s obvious inability to continue its expansionary aims on a pace concurrent with that of the 1960s and 1970s, and the decline in services and middle-class expansion that this contraction necessitates is pushed primarily onto the current other, the nicas. Hence the nicas represent the same type of threat that worried Clodomiro Picado (2004: 244) in 1939 when he proclaimed "OUR BLOOD IS BLACKENING! If blacks function as an other that can make "regular" Costa Ricans whiter; nicas function as an other that blacken everyone.
This essay proceeds on the basis of a comparative historical analysis of the construction of whiteness counterposed to black and nica otherness in the Costa Rican polity. After a brief discussion of theories of whiteness, I move on to address whiteness and uniqueness specifically in the Costa Rican context as it manifests in policy and attitudes towards blacks and nicas in the social democratic experiment.
Whiteness
2 Nica has become a derogatory term used specifically to describe Nicaraguan migrants of the post 1990 period. Nicas are distinct from both previous Nicaraguan migrants, Nicaraguan refugees of the Sandinista war, and Nicaraguans -those individuals of Nicaraguan nationality who are not thought to drain resources from Costa Rica, e.g. businesspeople and the middle-class.
Whiteness studies have increased significantly since the 1990s, in two distinct settings.
That literature which stems from the American political context portrays whiteness as a metanarrative or master frame explicates relationships of race, politics, economics, and culture.
Scholarly inquires into the construction of whiteness dovetailed with growing interest in the making of majorities within a variety of national settings. Scholars such as David Roediger (1991) and Noel Ignatiev (1996) provided compelling histories of the expansion of whiteness to cover ethnic groups previously identified as various minorities and as very obviously not white.
Others take more contemporary approaches to whiteness; portraying it primarily as invisible and as a form of skin privilege in contemporary American society (Frankenberg 1993; McIntosh 1988) . Whiteness functions under the radar, acting as a neutral and unrecognized component of identity. In this sense "blackness becomes conflated with being oppressed and whiteness is conflated with the privilege of "normalcy"" (Twine 1996: 215) . This normalcy and lack of recognition are thought to define white culture, which is conflated with majority culture.
Because of this white/majority culture is thought to be defined as indistinct and empty (Lipsitz 2006; Roediger 1991) . Conley (2001: 25) concurs; "Ask any African American to list the adjectives that describe him, and he will most likely put black or African American at the top of the list. Ask someone of European descent the same question, and white will be far down on the list, if at all."
Yet the notion that whiteness is empty rests on at least two problematic assumptions: that culture only belongs to racial groups, and that clear lines differentiate racialized peoples internally and externally (Rasmussen et. al 2001: 11) . It is difficult to sustain such assumptions within a Latin American context. Perhaps the most useful cross-national application of critical whiteness theories is the recognition that whiteness is contextual and dialogical. Whiteness has been equally central in the Latin American context, whether via processes of mestizaje or whitening (Garner 2007; Wade 1997; Whitten and Torres 1998) . Studies of whitening projects in Latin American and its eventual ramifications are abundant (Andrews 2004; Hanchard 1994; Skidmore 1974; Yashar 2005) . Often taken to mean the physical process of race mixture and lightening, whitening can be taken as a much wider project, denoted as the process of becoming "more urban, more Christian, more civilized, less rural, less black, less indian . . ." (Whitten 1981 : 15 quoted in Wade 1997 . National projects to whiten the nation have varied in terms of their form, success, and extent. Costa Rica is often perceived as one of the more "successful"
cases. I turn to it now.
Costarricense, por dicha 3 While Costa Rica is often cited as the Switzerland of Central America, much of its "success" in the creation of a white or homogenous nations has been self-proclaimed (Sandoval 2004a; Molina 2003 ). Yet, the notion of whitening as both and racial and, perhaps more importantly, cultural is central to the Costa Rican context and is recognized both domestically and internationally. Imagined ethnic homogeneity has been a part of Costa Rica almost from its foundation (Palmer and Molina 2004) . Skin color and race as a phenotypical or biological characteristic or, "the white myth of racial purity," carries a great deal of weight in Costa Rican society (Gudmundson 1986; Harpelle 2001) . Early definitions of the nation emphasized the racial purity of Costa Rican society, predicated on patterns of rural yeoman farmers and white descended ancestors (Harpelle 2001; Lascaris 1994; Monge Alfaro 1941 Racism and discrimination against West Indians in the first half of the twentieth century was noticeable, especially after 1920. Beyond the aforementioned prohibitions on immigration and movement, popular discourse implicated blacks as infantile, lazy, dirty and dangerous (Sandoval 2004a; Sharman 2001) . In 1939 Picado lamented that the blood of the entire country was blackening as a result of black immigration to Costa Rica; newspaper editorials expressed similar concerns that allowing blacks to stay in Costa Rica could only contribute to its decline [Duncan and Meléndez 2005; Picado (1939 Picado ( ) 2004 . As the UFC moved its operation from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific to avoid encroaching banana diseases, it took many of its services and infrastructure with it. As the Costa Rican government stepped in, it heeded calls to deal with the foreigners. The Cortés government (1936-40) is particularly notable for its attempts to push West Indians out of Costa Rica, via legislation meant to create hardship: in the four years of his administration registration of all foreigners was required, and citizenship pushed, even as both were made harder to achieve. Rents on farmland increased dramatically even as services dried up (Harpelle 2001) .
At this point in Costa Rica"s history, whiteness was predicated on peacefulness and equality, but these traits were restricted to those who fit the other mandatory component of whiteness -fair skin. Concerns about the supposed blackening population and its impact on national identity were clear. But, the timing of this backlash indicates that much of it was predicated on economic issues of the 1920s through the 1940s. Those suffering the effects of world economic recession and war looked for a set of foreigners on whom to place their blame, any population would do. That is not to say that racism and discrimination emanating from a perception of white unity did not weigh heavily, but it does explain the timing of heavy racial sentiment, and why such severe antipathy to blacks was magically superseded just a short time later.
Increasingly, and especially in the post-Civil war era, there was an emphasis on integrating blacks into the population. The language of these appeals indicates that blacks were not irredeemably black. They simply needed instruction and encouragement. For instance, Carlos Alfaro Monge (1941: 126) noted that the Costa Rican negro -note the possessive -was "in magnificent physical condition, but pedantic and stupid... [they were] a transient group without national consciousness and no spiritual nationality." This comment is a direct and unequivocal slur against people of African descent. And yet these complaints are of the type that could be "fixed." Regardless of the discriminatory, and to some extent successful attempts of the Cortés administration (and others) to push blacks out, they were clearly undergoing a transition from West Indians to black Costa Ricans, at least in some sectors of the public imagination.
Hence, an integrationist shift was required, and it began in force in the 1940s. As early as 1940 public officials began a push to change the language of education from English to Spanish and the provision of education from private and Protestant to public and Catholic (Palmer 2005 Figueres" embrace of Afro-Costarricans was strategic for a number of reasons. In the first place, he needed their votes to gain future office. 6 While others worried about the "grave . . . and irregular acts" that might be committed by those who "had not "properly" adopted the customs or Beyond short-term instrumental calculations, the social democratic experiment of the post civil war era required a major shift in the subjectivity of Costa Rica"s black others. It had been politically and economically convenient to consider them as simple foreigners, and then as a black menace. But in the post 1948 era, if the social democratic experiment was to work, then blacks had to be integrated into the Costa Rican polity. A democratic regime cannot claim legitimacy without the successful political and economic incorporation of the lower strata of the population (Lipset 1959: 83) . Costa Rica"s expanding national identity continued to be predicated on whiteness, but that whiteness expanded to include democraticness, and, increasingly in the latter part of the twentieth century, peacefulness. It may indeed have been the case that social democracy functioned simply as a convenient sidestep to racism (Sharman 2001: 49) . But, Costa Rica"s social democratic mission could not be accomplished if there remained a black population that was actively discriminated against. This was true not because white Costa
Ricans began necessarily to think about blacks differently, or to embrace them more, but because civilized (e.g. white) people did not discriminate in such barbaric ways. These were the hard fought lessons of Costa Rica"s own civil war and of the World War II. Hence, acceptance, on some level, of blackness, became increasingly necessary for Costa Rican whiteness, to continue.
Costa Ricans discovered that a little bit of blackness did not necessarily negate whiteness; in some cases it enhanced it.
There was yet one more reason that Afro-Costarricans had to be integrated. The 1949
Constitution, constructed on a social democratic basis, granted citizenship to blacks and officially ended all prohibitions on movement, real or imagined. Hence, at the popular level white identity could no longer be predicated on absence of blackness from the meseta central.
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With the lifting of restrictions on movement and the expansion of services, particularly education, into the Atlantic, the likelihood of increased internal migration was high. In fact, it fear of this looming black immigration threat likely fostered acceptance of social democratic policies. Hence Costa Rican elites had to think of a way to sustain the myth of whiteness even in the face of a more obvious, and localized, black presence. Public discourse which continued, and continues, to sustain a myth of racial homogeneity is certainly one popular way to do this.
Tourist brochures and media portrayals continue to paint Costa Rica as a white, middle-class, and often blond-haired society, belying the obvious reality on the ground (Molina 2003; Sandoval 2004b) . And yet, at some level, once it was clear that expelling blacks or relegating them to a reserve, as had been done with the remaining indigenous populations, were not viable options. The country had to think of some way to integrate blacks into the nation-building project.
Said differently, blacks became a necessary other in the social democratic project; democratic legitimacy would rest on their inclusion. For the project to work there had to be some population(s) in need of integration and redemption; blacks and women served this purpose well. Moreover, there had to be success stories to which one could point as evidence that a black person can be successful. Black elected officials such as Britton and Curling, among others, fulfilled this role. Success cases such as these allow elites to ignore criticisms that Limón remains one of the poorest and regions in the country, and that a large percentage of its inhabitants fall below the poverty line (Harpelle 2001) . The beauty of the social democratic experiment is that it does not require that every individual be successful, simply that everyone has the possibility. That blacks could achieve, if they put their minds to it, is enough. The fact that many do not is thought to speak to an individual problem, not a structural political issue.
Moreover, the expansion of notions of whiteness allows for successful blacks to be defined as white (Biesanz et al., 1999; Wade 1997) .
It was especially helpful that many Afro-Costarricans shared a similar sentiment. Purcell (1993) makes a cogent argument that a strong notion of solidarity was and is central among Afro-Costarricans. This solidarity is not race-based, however defined. Instead it is based on proper behavior, comportment, and attitudes. Educated -read cultured -people are welcome in, and central to the community, whereas illiterate -read badly behaved -and other similarly designated people are designated as outsiders in the community. In opposition to whiteness, blackness is drawn not on skin color, but on a commitment to black communitas (Sharman 2001: 58) . It was in this sense that Afro-Costarricans could be successfully brought in to an expanded national identity project that met the needs and ideas of both parties. The expansion of whiteness was not simply a top down project, but one with which black social mores dovetailed quite nicely. There were some instrumental reasons for this welcoming policy. In an effort to make Costa Rica a "showcase for democracy" USAID contributed some 592 million dollars in economic aid to Costa Rica between 1983 and 1985; it contributed just over 1 billion dollars over the 1980s period in return for visible signs of Costa Rica"s contra support (Edelman 1999: 77-78 ). Yet, strategic concerns alone do not explain Costa Rican attitudes towards Nicaraguans.
Estimates place the number of official refugees between 1983 and 1989 at roughly 30,000 (Basok 1990: 284) . Estimates of the total number of Nicaraguan refugees, including the undocumented, range from 100, 00 to 250,000 (Basok 1990 : 285, Biesanz et. al 1999 . If these estimates are to be believed, the Nicaraguan population "explosion" had already begun, but Unlike their West Indian predecessors, who migrated to a sparsely populated part of the country, whose migration was originally thought to be temporary, and who only migrated to the central valley much later and in much lesser numbers, nicas came directly to the heart of whiteness. Costa Rica"s central valley has been synonymous with whiteness in both its literalracial -form, and its expanded form. "Geography [has been] the basis for sharp distinction, ever since colonial days, between the more-developed center and the less developed periphery . . . those living farthest from the country"s center have always been among the poorest Ticos with the least political clout or access to government services" (Biesanz et. al. 1999: 126) . The meseta central is imagined as the most cosmopolitan, urban (e), educated, and cultured part of the country. Moreover, as the seat of national government -hence the seat of social democracyand the center (literal and metaphorical) of the country, it was imminently peaceful. Those violent events that did occur within the country remained largely outside of the central valley.
The central valley, especially San José and its immediate surrounds, is the "epicenter of the public sphere" (Molina 2003: 3) . In the popular imagination, nicas represent none of these things. Hence the nica population has been seen as an invasion, not just by dint of their large migrant numbers, but via their imposition on and disruption of the white center.
As is frequently (and increasingly) noted, nicas overlap with and signal economic and political decline in Costa Rica. At its height the social democratic project boasted some impressive successes: college enrollment figures were higher than many European countries; literacy rates passed 90 percent; major development and infrastructure projects were undertaken throughout the 1960s and 1970s; the percent of middle-class ticos increased from 12 percent in 1950 to 28 percent by the late 1970s; and public social expenditures reached new heights in the early 1980s (Mitchell and Pentzer 2008; Seligson and Muller 1987; Vargas Cullel, et al., 2006) .
This growth had very positive political impacts: in the 1978-79 period 84 percent of Costa Ricans expressed strong system support and a notable 88.2 percent indicated trust in and respect for the country"s democratic political institutions (Seligson and Muller 1987: 312 ).
Yet numerous data indicate that the country was nearing the end of the expanding welfare state model in the early 1980s. The state"s interventionist growth model was quite impressive in its impacts, but it was financed with significant and increasing debt. Costa Rica"s debt shot from 840 million dollars in 1978 to more than 3 billion by 1982; in the same time inflation soared from single digits to almost 100 percent, and unemployment doubled (Edelman 1999: 3; Seligson and Muller 1987: 315) . The Gross National Product declined from a positive 6.1 percent in the 1966-1967 period to negative 11.5 percent by 1982 (Céspedes et al., 1984: 56) . In 1981 Costa
Rica declared that it would stop servicing its foreign debt, preceding similar announcements Costa Ricans have become increasingly uncertain of the social democratic model and this is manifested in consistent declines in public trust, high electoral abstention rates, and continuing economic belt tightening (Vargas-Cullel et al., 2006; Lehoucq 2005) . It has also manifested itself in severe backlash against nica immigrants. Despite all of the difficulties that AfroCostarricans have faced, the country has shown itself to be particularly adept at homogenizing others into the national space, if only via processes of marginalization and invisibilization. But nicas represent "the most extraordinary challenge to the homogenizing powers of Costa Rica" not because of the mestizo mixture that they represent, nor because they are qualitatively more "other" than blacks or the indigenous (Palmer and Molina 2004: 230) . They are a challenge because of the physical space they occupy (the outskirts of San José and the central valley) and the economic and political decline that they represent. Costa Rica can no longer afford to welcome the visitors, because they are increasingly (if inaccurately) seen to be taking away money and resources from a country that can no longer afford it. One of the key components of whiteness in Costa Rica -its opposition to the darkness and poverty of the rest of Central America -is fraying. In this manner, the nica experience overlaps quite a bit with the West Indian experience. They function not only in contraposition to white identity, but as scapegoats made to take responsibility for much larger internal processes.
Some of the opposition to the nica population appears to be racially motivated, or to take on a racialized tone. Comments that frame them as pests and contaminants are quite frequent (Sandoval 2004b; Palmer and Molina 2004) . Indeed, Sandoval (2004b: 28) notes that the four most prolific media frames associated with nicas are disease, immigration, border conflicts, and
criminality. Yet, a great degree of the negative sentiment and discrimination appears to be predicated on the notion of what nicas take away. One primary complaint appears to be that nicas take jobs and resources away from deserving Costa Ricans. The other is that nicas bring violence along with them. Notions that the nicas cause most of the violence in Costa Rica have been continually disproven; and yet the association continues (Biesanz et al., 1999; Sandoval 2004a) . Interestingly, the scapegoating process is not limited to nicas. In fact, Costa Ricans appear to blame many of their troubles on convenient foreigners. Oettler (2007: 18) 
Towards a Conclusion
In this exploratory study I have attempted to trace the evolution of notions race and whiteness in Costa Rica and their relationship to national identity. Specifically I sought to map the process of non-"white" integration into the Costa Rican national project. I find that both black and nica minority groups have been central to the national identity, albeit in distinct ways.
Black Costa Ricans were vital to the success of the social democratic project, hence notions of whiteness expanded to incorporate them into the national polity. Nicas have been instrumental in turning whiteness on its head, constricting notions of whiteness to a smaller and smaller qualified group (e.g. the upper class). The ramifications of this disrupture remain to be seen.
Significant evidence indicates that nicas are not nearly as draining nor as problematic as popular sentiment indicates. Yet it is clear that Costa Rica is undergoing a crisis of confidence that is predicated in large part on concerns of its declining exceptionalism.
